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Abstract
A firm is selling a product to different types (based on the features such
as education backgrounds, ages, etc.) of customers over a finite season with
non-replenishable initial inventory. The type label of an arriving customer
can be observed but the demand function associated with each type is ini-
tially unknown. The firm sets personalized prices dynamically for each
type and attempts to maximize the revenue over the season. We provide
a learning algorithm that is near-optimal when the demand and capacity
scale in proportion. The algorithm utilizes the primal-dual formulation of
the problem and learns the dual optimal solution explicitly. It allows the
algorithm to overcome the curse of dimensionality (the rate of regret is in-
dependent of the number of types) and sheds light on novel algorithmic
designs for learning problems with resource constraints.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic pricing has been a popular practice in many industries such as travel,
entertainment, and retail. When the capacity cannot be adjusted within the sales
horizon, dynamic pricing can increase revenues significantly by adjusting prices
in response to the change in the marginal value of capacity. Recently, due to
the emergence of online channels, personalized dynamic pricing has become the
new trend: the firm can observe the type of an arriving customer and design
a customized price accordingly. The type may correspond to the features of a
customer, such as age, gender and address, which can be observed or inferred
through membership programs and browser cookies. Being able to set discrimi-
natory prices and extract more revenues from a customer type benefits the firm
tremendously.
Such information, however, presents not only opportunities but also chal-
lenges to the firm. Because of the personalization, the demand forecasting from
the historical data, which usually reflects the price sensitivity of the entire mar-
ket, is of little use. Instead, the firm has to form accurate demand estimates for
each type of customers.
In this paper, we consider a firm selling a product over a finite sales hori-
zon. The inventory is given at the beginning of the horizon and not allowed
to be replenished. There are M types of customers arriving sequentially to pur-
chase the product. Although the type label is observed by the firm, the demand
functions associated with each type are not known initially. Therefore, the firm
has to experiment different prices for each type of customers to learn the de-
mand functions and find the optimal prices. Therefore, it features the explo-
ration/exploitation (learning/earning) trade-off.
We propose a learning algorithm for the personalized dynamic pricing prob-
lem described above. Compared to the literature, our algorithm explicitly learns
the dual solution, in addition to the optimal prices in the primal space. This al-
lows the algorithm to achieve the near-optimal regret, a measure commonly used
to assess learning algorithms.
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1.1. Contributions and Insights
This paper contributes to the literature in two regards. Theoretically, the algo-
rithm achieves the near-optimal regret for a special class of the network rev-
enue management problems: there are M products (types) with one resource
constraint. To the best of our knowledge, no algorithms are shown to have the
same regret under the general assumptions.1 See Section 1.2 for a thorough dis-
cussion.
From the perspective of algorithmic design, we demonstrate the feasibility
of integrating the primal-dual formulation and learning. The dual variable is
not a typical target to learn in the learning literature, because unlike the primal
variables, it cannot be experimented directly. In our algorithm, we empirically
estimate the Lagrangian function and sequentially form interval estimators for
the dual optimal solution. This approach may provide novel algorithmic archi-
tectures for other learning problems with resource constraints.
This paper provides the following qualitative insights:
• It pays off to explicitly learn the dual optimal solution. The pricing de-
cisions for M types of customers are coupled through the inventory con-
straint. However, having an accurate estimator for the dual optimal solu-
tion helps to decouple them into M independent learning problems. This
is the key reason why our algorithm can achieve the near-optimal regret.
• The learning complexity depends on not only the number of primal deci-
sion variables, but also the number of dual variables. As shown by Besbes and Zeevi
(2012); Slivkins (2014), a high-dimensional decision vector (M in this case)
usually significantly complicates learning, reflecting the curse of dimen-
sionality. Slivkins (2014) shows that the best achievable regret for a generic
learning problem without resource constraints is n−1/(2+M) whereM is the
dimension of the decision vector2. In contrast, we are able to obtain the
rate n−1/2 whose exponent is independent of M . This is because the M de-
1The algorithm in Chen et al. (2018) achieves the same regret assuming the objective function
is infinitely smooth with uniformly bounded derivatives.
2The rate of regret usually involves logarithmic terms. When there is no ambiguity, we omit
those terms because they are dominated by the polynomial terms.
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cision variables can be decoupled if the value of the dual optimal solution
is given, and thus the effective dimension of the problem is no more than
the number of dual variables, which is one in our case.
1.2. Literature Review
There is a stream of rapidly growing literature on a firm’s pricing problem when
the demand function is unknown (e.g. Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Araman and Caldentey,
2009; Farias and Van Roy, 2010; Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012; den Boer and Zwart,
2014, 2015; Keskin and Zeevi, 2014; Cheung et al., 2017). See den Boer (2015)
for a comprehensive survey. Since the firm does not know the optimal price,
it has to experiment different (suboptimal) prices and update its belief about
the underlying demand function. Therefore, the firm has to balance the explo-
ration/exploitation trade-off, which is usually referred to as the learning-and-
earning problem in this line of literature. Among them, our paper is related to
thosewith nonparametric formulations and inventory constraints (Besbes and Zeevi,
2009;Wang et al., 2014; Lei et al., 2017). In addition, we consider personalized dy-
namic pricing for multiple types of customers, while most of the above papers
consider a single type.
Personalized dynamic pricing can be regarded as a special case of learning
with contextual information (Qiang and Bayati, 2016; Javanmard and Nazerzadeh,
2016; Cohen et al., 2016; Ban and Keskin, 2017; Chen and Gallego, 2018). The
main difference of our paper from this stream of literature is summarized below.
First, instead of representing the contextual information by a feature vector, we
choose to use discrete types to categorize customers. Since the number of types is
arbitrary, our setup is merely a technical simplification without losing too much
practical generality. Second, we use a nonparametric formulation for the objec-
tive function. That is, the demand functions of each type of customers are only
required to satisfy some basic assumptions such as continuity without any spe-
cific forms. Third, unlike this literature, we consider an inventory constraint and
thus the pricing decision made over time has intertemporal dependence.
The problem studied in this paper is a special case of network revenue man-
agement (Gallego and Van Ryzin, 1997) and thus closely related to the literature
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on demand learning in that setting. Besbes and Zeevi (2012) study the general
network revenue management problem with unknown demand functions when
the price for each product are chosen from a discrete set. The proposed algo-
rithm achieves diminishing regret when the inventory and demand are scaled
in proportion. Ferreira et al. (2017) study the same problem as Besbes and Zeevi
(2012) and show that Thompson sampling can achieve the rate of regret, n−1/2,
which is the best one can hope for with even one product and one resource. For
continuous prices, however, Besbes and Zeevi (2012) demonstrate that learning
may suffer from the curse of dimensionality. The incurred regret may grow at
rate n−1/(d+3) with d products (which is equivalent to the number of types in
our problem). This is consistent with the result in Slivkins (2014), which stud-
ies a generic learning problem without inventory constraints. The tight regret
bound derived in Slivkins (2014) grows at n−1/(d+2) ford continuous decision vari-
ables. Sufficient smoothness may relieve the curse of dimensionality, as argued
by Besbes and Zeevi (2012); Chen et al. (2018). In particular, with an infinite de-
gree of smoothness, Chen et al. (2018) design an algorithm that almost achieves
rate n−1/2. In this paper, we present a learning algorithm that achieves the op-
timal rate n−1/2 with one resource constraint and arbitrary number of products
(types), without imposing smoothness conditions.
This paper is also related to the vast literature studying multi-armed bandit
problems. See Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012)
for a comprehensive survey. The classic multi-armed bandit problem involves
finite arms. There is a stream of literature studying the so-called continuum-
armed bandit problems (Kleinberg, 2005; Auer et al., 2007; Kleinberg et al., 2008;
Bubeck et al., 2011), inwhich there are infinite number of arms (decisions). Slivkins
(2014) provides a tight regret bound on a generic learning problem with multi-
ple continuous decision variables; the regret deteriorates exponentially as the
number of decisions increases, demonstrating the curse of dimensionality. This
line of literature does not consider resource constraints. Recently, there are stud-
ies combining multi-armed bandit problems with resource constraints, which
is referred to as bandits with knapsacks (BwK) Badanidiyuru et al. (2013, 2014);
Agrawal and Devanur (2014). The regret derived in those papers is not directly
comparable to ours, because the decisions are discrete in their setting. This pa-
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per is also related to online convex optimization (OCO); see Shalev-Shwartz et al.
(2012) for a review. , It is worth pointing out that the duality approach has been
used in BwK and OCO to implement the algorithm and prove the regret bound.
However, the dual optimal solution is typically not learned explicitly. One ex-
ception is Mahdavi et al. (2013), whose algorithm learns the dual solutions by
gradient descent in the primal/dual space. In their OCO setting, the function is
given in each period and the gradient can be evaluated, which does not apply to
our problem.
2. Problem Formulation
Consider a monopolistic firm selling a single product in a finite selling seasonT ,
with c units of initial inventory. The product cannot be replenished and perishes
at the end of the horizon with zero salvage values. There are M types of cus-
tomers. Customers with the same type have similar features such as education
backgrounds, ages, and addresses. The firm observes the type of each arriving
customer, and is allowed to price-discriminate according to the type. This is re-
ferred to as personalized pricing, which is increasingly popular in online retail-
ing due to the observation that the demand function differs dramatically across
types. Therefore, we model the arrival of type-m customers by a Poisson process
with instantaneous rate dm(pm(t)), where pm(t) is the price charged for type-m
customers at time t and dm(·) is the demand function of type-m customers.
We focus on the case that the information of the demand function associated
with each type and the type distribution among the population is absent at the be-
ginning of the season. The objective of the firm is to maximize the expected rev-
enue collected over the horizon, subject to the inventory constraint. To achieve
the goal, the firm has to learn the demand function dm(·) form = 1, . . . ,M and
the associated optimal prices in the process. We first characterize the problem
when all the information is available.
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2.1. The full-information Benchmark
When dm(·) is known to the firm, then the firm’s objective is to maximize
J (T , c) = max
p(t)∈Ft
E
[
M∑
m=1
∫ T
t=0
pm(t)dNm,t (dm(pm(t)))
]
(1)
subject to
M∑
m=1
∫ T
t=0
dNm,t (dm(pt )) ≤ c,
where p(t) = {p1(t), . . . ,pM (t)} is a pricing policy that is adapted to the filtra-
tion Ft with respect to the sales process, and Nm,t (λt ) is an independent Poisson
process with instantaneous rate λt . When the inventory is depleted, then p(t) is
forced to be p∞, which is a menu of choke prices at which future demand from
all types is turned off.
A classic approach in revenue management (e.g., see Gallego and Van Ryzin
1997) to this problem is to consider the fluid approximation of (1). That is
JD(T , c) = max
p(t)
M∑
m=1
∫ T
t=0
pm(t)dm(pm(t))dt (2)
subject to
M∑
m=1
∫ T
t=0
dm(pm(t))dt ≤ c,
where we have replaced the Poisson process Nm,t (dm(pm(t)) in the original for-
mulation by the intensity dm(pm(t)). Note that the fluid approximation (2) is a
deterministic optimization problem. Before presenting the primal-dual formula-
tion of (2), we make the following standard assumption:
Assumption 1. For p ∈ [0,+∞) andm = 1, . . . ,M , we assume
1. The demanddm(p) is strictly decreasingwith an inverse functiond−1m (·) and
bounded with dm(p) ≤ M1.
2. Define the revenue rate as a function of the demand rate λ, rm(λ) , λd−1m (λ).
The functions rm(λ), dm(p) and d−1m (λ) are Lipschitz continuous with factor
M2.
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3. r (λ) is twice-differentiable and strictly concave, 0 < M3 ≤ −r ′′m(λ) ≤ M4.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 implies that both dm(p) and d−1m (λ) are differentiable.
The derivatives are bounded by the interval [−M2,−1/M2].
Primal-dual Formulation
Consider the Lagrangian function for the fluid approximation (2)
L(p(t), z) = cz +
M∑
m=1
∫ T
t=0
(pm(t) − z)dm(pm(t))dt (3)
and the dual function
д(z) = max
p(t)
{L(p(t), z)} = cz +max
p(t)
{
M∑
m=1
∫ T
t=0
(pm(t) − z)dm(pm(t))dt
}
. (4)
Under Assumption 1, the following quantities are well defined
Rm(z) , max
p
{dm(p)(p − z)} and Pm(z) , argmax
p
{dm(p)(p − z)} . (5)
Rm(z) and Pm(z) can be interpreted as the optimal value and optimal solution
of the profit-maximization problem for type-m customers when the unit cost is
z. They are closely related to the dual function (4) as д(z) = cz +T ∑Mm=1 Rm(z);
provided with a dual variable z, the optimal p(t) in (4) is time-invariant: pm(t) ≡
Pm(z). The properties are summarized below:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, we have
1. Pm(z) is increasing in z and P′m(z) is bounded.
2. Rm(z) is decreasing and convex in z; R′m(z) = −
∑M
m=1 dm(Pm(z)).
3. д(z) is twice differentiable and strictly convex.
4. Let z∗ , argminz≥0{д(z)}. The optimal solution to (2) is pm(t) ≡ p∗m ,
Pm(z∗). Moreover, complementary slackness holds: z∗(c−T
∑M
m=1 dm(Pm(z∗))) =
0.
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Remark 2. To simplify the notation, we use the same set of constants as in As-
sumption 1 and assume that 0 < M3 ≤ д′′(z) ≤ M4; Pm(z) is Lipschitz continuous
with factorM2.
Proposition 1 states that the fluid approximation (2) admits a time-invariant
pricing policy p∗m . Moreover, the optimal solution is closely related to the dual
optimal solution z∗, which is usually interpreted as the shadow cost of inventory.
When z∗ > 0, the initial capacity is insufficient and thus the inventory constraint
is binding by complementary slackness: c = T
∑M
m=1 dm(Pm(z∗)). When z∗ =
0, the inventory is sufficient and the optimal price p∗m = Pm(0) maximizes the
revenue rate pdm(p) as if there is no inventory constraint.
Scaled Demand and Capacity
The connection between JD(T , c) and J (T , c) has been studied extensively in the
revenue management literature. In particular, Gallego and Van Ryzin (1997) find
that the revenue from the fluid approximation is an upper bound for the stochas-
tic problem, i.e., JD(T , c) ≥ J (T , c). The tie becomes closer when the demand
and capacity scale in proportion: if we index a sequence of systems by n and
let dm,n(·) = ndm(·) and cn = nc in the nth system, then the revenues satisfy
JDn (T , c) − Jn(T , c) = O(
√
n). Since JDn (T , c) scales linearly in n, the gap between
JDn (T , c) and Jn(T , c) diminishes relative to the earned revenue as n grows. More
importantly, the optimal solution to (2), {p∗m}Mm=1, which also maximizes the fluid
approximation for the scaled system JDn (T , c), performs well in the stochastic
problem (1) as a special suboptimal pricing policy (it is constant and thus adapted
to Ft ). More precisely, the expected revenue for {p∗m}Mm=1 in thenth stochastic sys-
tem satisfies
JDn (T , c) − E
[
M∑
m=1
∫ τ
t=0
p∗mdNm,t (ndm(p∗m))
]
= O(√n),
where τ is the minimum ofT and the stopping time when the inventory reaches
zero. Combined with the fact that JDn ≥ Jn, {p∗m}Mm=1 is near-optimal in the nth
stochastic system. Therefore, the prices {p∗m}Mm=1 are the goal of our learning
policy when dm(·) is not known to the firm.
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2.2. The Learning Policy and the Target Regret
Suppose the firm does not know dm(·) at the beginning of the horizon. To earn
high expected revenues over the horizon, the firm adopts an Ft -predictable pric-
ing policy π . That is, at time t , πt only depends on the adopted prices and the
observed sales for each type of customers prior to t . It then outputs a price
vector {P1(t), . . . , Pm(t)} for each type of customers at time t . We denote the
expected revenue associated with a policy π by Jπ (T , c). Clearly, the unavail-
ability of the information regarding dm(·) incurs a cost to the firm, and thus
Jπ (T , c) ≤ J (T , c) ≤ JD(T , c).
The objective of this study is to design a policy so that J (T , c) − Jπ (T , c) is
small, especially when demand and capacity are scaled. Therefore, similar to
Besbes and Zeevi (2009), we consider the following criterion, referred to as the
regret, of a policy π :
Rπn (T , c) = 1 −
Jπn (T , c)
JDn (T , c)
, (6)
where Jπn (T , c) is the expected revenue π generates in the nth stochastic system.
Note that π may depend on n, and we suppress the dependence to simplify nota-
tions. The regret measures the revenue loss JDn (T , c)− Jπn (T , c) relative to JDn (T , c).
The goal of the policy π is to ensure limn→∞ Rπn (T , c) = 0. That is, the learning
incurs no significant cost for large systems.
It has been shown in Besbes and Zeevi (2009);Wang et al. (2014) that forM =
1, any learning policy incurs regret whose rate is no less than n−1/2 for some
problem instances. Indeed, even if we replace Jπn (T , c) by Jn(T , c), which is the
full-information upper bound for Jπn (T , c), the quantity (6) is of order n−1/2 by
the discussion in Section 2.1. In other words, one cannot expect to design a
learning policy whose regret grows slower than n−1/2. Thus, n−1/2 (possibly with
logarithmic terms in n) is the target regret of our proposed learning policy.
3. The Primal-dual Learning Algorithm
In this section, we introduce an algorithm (learning policy) based on the primal-
dual formulation. We first explain the steps of the algorithm, and then analyze
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its regret. Combined with the lower bound for regret in Besbes and Zeevi (2009);
Wang et al. (2014), the regret of the algorithm achieves near optimality for the
problem considered in Section 2.
Before proceeding, we state what the firm has information of initially. The
firm knows M , T , n, c, and the constants specified by Assumption 1. Moreover,
we impose a mild assumption in addition to Assumption 1.
Assumption 2. There exist intervals [p,p] and [0, z] such that p∗m ∈ (p,p) and
z∗ ∈ (0, z) for allm. Moreover, {Pm(z) : z ∈ [0, z]} ⊂ [p,p]. The intervals [p,p]
and [0, z] are known to the firm.
Note thatp∗m and z
∗ are the primal/dual optimal solutions to the fluid approxi-
mation (2). Assumption 2 states that although the firm does not know the optimal
solutions, it does have the information of their ranges. Since p,p and z can be
arbitrary finite numbers, this assumption is not restrictive.
3.1. The Intuition
We first explain the intuition behind the algorithm. If the firm knew the full
information, then it would have found the pricing policy p∗m through the primal-
dual formulation
z∗ = argmin
z≥0
{д(z)} = argmin
z≥0
{
cz +T
M∑
m=1
Rm(z)
}
(7)
p∗m = Pm(z∗) ∀m = 1, . . . ,M .
When the information of dm(p) is not available, both optimization problems are
unsolvable. However, the firm can experiment with different prices and use the
observed sales as a noisy but unbiased estimator for dm(p) at those prices. The
noisy estimator is a Poisson random variable. Then, the firm could plug the
estimators into (7) to solve them “empirically”, obtaining estimators for z∗ and
p∗m form = 1, . . . ,M . One would imagine that the estimators for z
∗ andp∗m are not
necessarily accurate. Indeed, the accuracy of such a procedure depends crucially
on two aspects:
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1. The length of the period during which the price is experimented. The
longer the period, the less noisy the estimators for dm(p) are.
2. The granularity of the experimented prices. The estimator for dm(p) is
based on a discrete set of prices. It inevitably incurs discretization error in
order to solve a continuous optimization problem (7).
Ideally, to obtain accurate estimators for z∗ and p∗m , the firm would set a refined
grid of prices for each type of customers and try each price for a long period
during the season. Those suboptimal prices, however, lead to substantial revenue
loss.
To solve the exploration/exploitation dilemma, we divide [0,T ] into multiple
phases. After each phase, the sales for each type of customers during the phase
are observed at a set of prices to form estimators for dm(p). Then (7) is solved
empirically to obtain point estimators for z∗ and p∗m . In the next phase, those
point estimators are used to form interval estimators for z∗ and p∗m . The interval
estimators help to narrow down the range of prices to experiment. Therefore,
as the algorithm enters new phases, the burden to explore is gradually relieved
and it can afford to try a more refined price grid for a longer period of time. The
revenue loss is also limited because the experimented prices fall into a narrow
interval containing p∗m with high probability.
3.2. Description of the Algorithm
Nextwe explain the details of the algorithm. Let {P1(t), . . . , PM(t)} be the stochas-
tic pricing policy associated with π . Without further mention, we always sup-
pose that when the inventory is depleted, Pm(t) is automatically switched to the
choke price p∞ for allm. Given n, the algorithm divides [0,T ] into consecutive
phases k = 1, 2, . . . ,K . The length of phase k is τ (k). We also denote the begin-
ning of phase k by tk . Thus tk =
∑k−1
i=1 τ
(i). Let ϵ > 0 be a small constant.
At the beginning of phase k , the firm has interval estimators for p∗m and z
∗,
[p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and [z(k), z(k)], obtained from the last phase, which ensure that p∗m ∈
[p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and z∗ ∈ [z(k), z(k)] with high probability. During phase k , the price
interval [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ], whose length is denoted ∆(k)m , is discretized to N (k)+1 equally
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spaced grid points, i.e.,p
(k)
m,j , p
(k)
m
+jδ
(k)
m for j = 0, . . . ,N
(k) and δ (k)m , ∆
(k)
m /(N (k)+
1). During phase i, the algorithm sets pricep(k)m,j for type-m customers for a period
of length τ (k)/(N (k) + 1).
At the end of phasek , the observed sales,D
(k)
m,j , from type-m customers at price
p
(k)
m,j is a Poisson random variable with mean ndm(p(k)m,j )τ (k)/(N (k) + 1). Therefore,
an unbiased estimate for dm(p(k)m,j) is
dˆ
(k)
m,j ,
N (k) + 1
nτ (k)
D
(k)
m,j .
To form a point estimator for z∗, the firm substitutes dˆ(k)m,j intoд(z) (the right-hand
side of the first equation of (7)), i.e.,
д(z) = cz +T
M∑
m=1
max
pm
dm(pm)(pm − z) ≈ cz +T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z).
To find z ∈ [z(k), z(k)] that maximizes the above expression, the firm divides
[z(k), z(k)], whose length is denoted ∆(k)z , into N (k)z equally spaced grid points,
z(k) + jδ (k)z for j = 0, . . . ,N
(k)
z and δ
(k)
z , ∆
(k)
z /(N (k)z + 1). Therefore, a point
estimator for z∗ can be obtained as follows3:
z(k)∗ , argmin
z∈
{
z(k )+iδ (k )z
}N (k )z
i=0
{
cz +T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z)
}
. (8)
Based on z(k)∗, the firm can obtain point estimators for p∗m by the second equation
in (7):
p
(k)∗
m , p
(k)
m,j∗m
, where j∗m = argmax
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)∗). (9)
This completes the procedure in phase k .
At the beginning of phasek+1, the firm constructs interval estimators [p(k+1)
m
,p
(k+1)
m ]
([z(k+1), z(k+1)]) based on the point estimators p(k)∗m (z(k)∗ ) and pre-specified width
3Alternatively, the firm can find z(k)∗ by solving the first-order condition for д(z), c −
T
∑
M
m=1 dm(Pm(z)) = 0, using the empirical version of dm and Pm . The regret analysis holds
for this case.
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∆¯
(k+1) (∆¯(k+1)z ) for allm:
p(k+1)
m
= max
{
p,p
(k)∗
m −
∆¯
(k+1)
2
}
, p
(k+1)
m = min
{
p,p
(k)∗
m +
∆¯
(k+1)
2
}
z(k+1) = max
{
0, z(k)∗ − ∆¯
(k+1)
z
2
}
, z(k+1) = min
{
z, z(k)∗ +
∆¯
(k+1)
z
2
}
. (10)
Note that the intervals are properly truncated by [p,p] and [0, z], and this is the
only reason why ∆¯(k+1) (∆¯(k+1)z ) can potentially be different from ∆
(k+1)
m (∆
(k+1)
z ).
Then the procedure is repeated for phase k + 1.
In the last phase, phaseK , the algorithm behaves differently after forming the
interval estimators [p(K )
m
,p
(K )
m ] and [z(K ), z(K )]. At the beginning of phase K , the
firm checks whether 0 ∈ [z(K ), z(K )]. If so, then with high probability z∗ = 0 and
the capacity is sufficient. Therefore, the price p∗m is the unconstrained maximizer
of pdm(p), i.e., Pm(0), for all m. As we will show in Section 3.3, the width of
the interval estimator [p(K )
m
,p
(K )
m ] is roughly ∆¯(K ) ∼ n−1/4. Therefore, if the firm
adheres to a constant price pm ∈ [p(K )
m
,p
(K )
m ] for type-m customers, the relative
revenue loss for type-m customers in phase K (ignoring the random fluctuation
of Poisson arrivals) is approximately
|p∗mdm(p∗m) − pdm(p)| ∼ (dm(p∗m) − dm(pm))2 ∼ (p∗m − pm)2 ∼ (∆¯(K ))2 ∼ n−1/2,
where we rely on the concavity in Assumption 1 and the fact thatp∗m ∈ [p(K )m ,p
(K )
m ]
with high probability. This meets the target regret in Section 2.2. Motivated by
the argument above, the algorithm simply charges a constant pricep
(K )
m = p
(K )
m +α
for type-m customers until the end of the season for a pre-specified parameter
α . Note that we slightly mark up the prices by a small adjustment α ∼ n−1/4
to guarantee that the inventory is sufficient when the inventory just meets the
unconstrained optimal prices, i.e., c = T
∑M
m=1 dm(p∗m).
If the firm finds 0 < [z(K ), z(K )] at the beginning of phase K , which implies
that z∗ > 0 and the capacity is insufficient with high probability, then a different
procedure has to be used in phaseK . The method for the case of z∗ = 0 no longer
works: because p∗m is no longer the unconstrained maximizer of pdm(p), even for
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pm,p
∗
m ∈ [p(K )m ,p
(K )
m ], we have
|p∗mdm(p∗m) − pdm(p)| ∼ |p∗m − pm | ∼ |∆¯(K ) | ∼ n−1/4.
This implies that a constant price in [p(K )
m
,p
(K )
m ] for type-m customers will fail to
meet the target regret. To address the problem, letplm = p
(K )
m
−α andpum = p(K )m +α
be conservative lower and upper bounds for p∗m . Let S(t) be the cumulative sales
aggregated from all types of customers up to time t . The algorithm in phase K is
divided into the following four steps:
1. For t ∈ (tK , tK + (logn)−ϵ ], apply plm to type-m customers. Record the
aggregate sales rate by D
(K )
l
. That is
D
(K )
l
, (logn)ϵ
M∑
m=1
∫ tK+(logn)−ϵ
tK
dNm,t (ndm(plm)). (11)
Clearly, D
(K )
l
is an unbiased estimator for n
∑M
m=1 dm(plm).
2. For t ∈ (tK + (logn)−ϵ , tK + 2(logn)−ϵ ], apply pum to type-m customers.
Record the aggregate sales rate D
(K )
u :
D
(K )
u , (logn)ϵ
M∑
m=1
∫ tK+2(logn)−ϵ
tK+(logn)−ϵ
dNm,t (ndm(pum)), (12)
which is an unbiased estimator for n
∑M
m=1 dm(pum).
3. At t = tK + 2(logn)−ϵ , solve θ ∈ [0, 1] from
(T − tK)(θD(K )l + (1 − θ )D
(K )
u ) = nc − S(tK). (13)
If the solution θ < [0, 1] (which will be shown to have negligible probabil-
ity), then we project it to [0, 1]. To interpret θ , note that nc − S(tK) is the
remaining inventory at tK , the beginning of phaseK . If D
(K )
l
and D
(K )
u were
equal to their means, n
∑M
m=1 dm(plm) and n
∑M
m=1 dm(pum), then in a fluid sys-
tem starting from tK with inventory nc − S(tK ), applying plm for type-m
customers for a period of length θ (T − tK) and pum for a period of length
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(1 − θ )(T − tK) would make the inventory reach zero right at T , according
to (13).
4. For t ∈ (tK + 2(logn)−ϵ ,T ], apply plm for a period of length θ (T − tK) −
(logn)−ϵ , and pum for a period of length (1 − θ )(T − tK ) − (logn)−ϵ until T .
The goal of the above steps is to ensure the deviation of S(T ) from nc is relatively
small. In particular, from Lemma 8 in Section 4, the steps guarantee |S(T )−nc | ∼
n−1/2. Without further exploring the price space4 the algorithm can still meet
the target regret with a little exploration on the aggregate demand rate and by
controlling the aggregate sales at T . We will discuss this point in Section 5. The
notations are summarized in Table 1 in the appendix. The detailed steps of the
algorithm are demonstrated in Algorithm 1.
3.3. Choice of Parameters
Let ϵ be a sufficiently small constant (independent of n). We set the following
parameter values in Step 3:
α = (logn)1+9ϵn−1/4
τ (k) = n−(1/2)(3/5)
k−1(logn)1+15ϵ for k ≤ K − 1
∆¯
(k)
= n−(1/4)(1−(3/5)
k−1)
∆¯
(k)
z = n
−(1/4)(1−(3/5)k−1)(logn)−2ϵ
N (k) = n(1/10)(3/5)
k−1(logn)3ϵ
N
(k)
z = n
(1/10)(3/5)k−1(logn)ϵ
K = min
{
k : (∆¯(k))2 ≤ n−1/2(logn)2+16ϵ
}
Therefore,
δ
(k)
m ≤ ∆¯(k)/N (k) = n−(1/4)(1−(3/5)
k )(logn)−3ϵ
δ
(k)
z ≤ ∆¯(k)z /N (k)z = n−(1/4)(1−(3/5)
k )(logn)−3ϵ
4Recall that the interval estimators for p∗m , ∆¯
(K ) ∼ n−1/4, are still too wide to meet the target
regret.
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Algorithm 1 The Primal-dual Learning Algorithm
1: Input: n, c, T , M
2: Constants: M1, M2, M3, M4, p, p, z
3: Parameters: ϵ , α , K , {τ (k)}K−1
k=1
, {∆¯(k), ∆¯(k)z ,N (k),N (k)z }Kk=1
4: Initialize: p(1)
m
= p, p
(1)
m = p, z
(1)
= 0, z(1) = z
5: for k = 1 to K − 1 do
6: tk ←
∑k−1
i=1 τ
(i)
⊲ The start of phase k
7: ∆
(k)
m → p(k)m − p(k)m and δ
(k)
m ← ∆(k)m /(N (k) + 1) form = 1, . . . ,M
8: for i = 0 to N (k) do
9: for t = tk + i
τ (k )
N (k )+1 to tk + (i + 1)
τ (k )
N (k )+1 do
10: Charge price p
(k)
m,i ← p(k)m + iδ
(k)
m to type-m customers
11: Record the observed sales D
(k)
m,i for p
(k)
m,i form = 1, . . . ,M
12: end for
13: dˆ
(k)
m,i ← N
(k )
+1
nτ (k ) D
(k)
m,i form = 1, . . . ,M ⊲ Empirical estimate for dm(p(k)m,i)
14: end for
15: ∆
(k)
z ← z(k) − z(k) and δ (k)z = ∆(k)z /(N (k)z + 1)
16: Obtain z(k)∗ according to (8) ⊲ Estimate the dual optimal solution
17: Obtain p
(k)∗
m according to (9) form = 1, . . . ,M ⊲ Estimate the primal
optimal solution
18: Obtain z(k+1), z(k+1), p(k+1)
m
, p
(k+1)
m according to (10) form = 1, . . . ,M ⊲
Obtain the interval estimators
19: end for
20: tK ←
∑K−1
i=1 τ
(i)
⊲ The beginning of phase K
21: if 0 ∈ [z(K ), z(K )] then ⊲ Sufficient capacity
22: for t = tK to T do
23: Charge price p
(K )
m ← p(K )m + α to type-m customers
24: end for
25: else ⊲ Insufficient capacity
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26: plm ← p(K )m − α and p
u
m ← p(K )m + α
27: for t = tK to tK + (logn)−ϵ do
28: Charge price plm to type-m customers
29: Record the aggregated sales rate D
(K )
l
according to (11)
30: end for
31: for t = tK + (logn)−ϵ to tK + 2(logn)−ϵ do
32: Charge price pum to type-m customers
33: Record the aggregated sales rate D
(K )
u according to (12)
34: end for
35: Let θ be the projection of the solution to (13) to [0, 1]
36: for t = tK + 2(logn)−ϵ to tK + θ (T − tK ) + (logn)−ϵ do
37: Charge price plm to type-m customers
38: end for
39: for t = tK + θ (T − tK) + (logn)−ϵ to T do
40: Charge price pum to type-m customers
41: end for
42: end if
The choice of parameters guarantees that p∗m ∈ [p(k)m ,p
(k)
m ] and z∗ ∈ [z(k), z(k)]
occur with high probability. Moreover, at the beginning of phaseK , the precision
of [p(K )
m
,p
(K )
m ] and [z(K ), z(K )] is ∆¯(K ) ∼ ∆¯(K )z ∼ n−1/4. The choices of τ (k), N (k), ∆¯(k)
and K are almost identical to that of Wang et al. (2014) in the sufficient-capacity
case, except for logarithmic terms. This is not surprising because our algorithm
targets the same precision n−1/4 of the interval estimators for p∗m . The readers
may refer to Section 4.2 of Wang et al. (2014) for an intuitive explanation for the
choice of these parameters.
4. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the regret of the primal-dual learning algorithm. To
simplify the notation, we sometimes resort to a less rigorous expression, such
as P(A) = 1 − O(n−1); its equivalence to P(Ac) = O(n−1) should be clear in the
context.
Before proceeding, we introduce a modified stochastic system. Technically, if
the inventory is depleted at t , then Pm(t)must be switched to p∞, a choke price at
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which the demand of type-m customers is turned off, for allm. We use a similar
simplification to Lei et al. (2017) and consider a slightly different problem. When
the inventory is depleted, instead of forced to set p∞ for all types of customers,
the firm can still use prices between [p,p]. To accommodate the extra demand,
it outsources the extra demand at a unit cost p. Denote the expected revenue of
this modified system by J˜πn . Because p is higher than the price charged, we must
have J˜πn ≤ Jπn . To bound JDn − Jπn , it suffices to bound JDn − J˜πn . Therefore, from
now on, we investigate the pricing policy Pm(t) associated with the algorithm
without switching to p∞ once the inventory is depleted.
Remark 3. The benefit of studying J˜πn instead of J
π
n is that the pricing policy π
can be implemented for t ∈ [0,T ] without having to switch to p∞ at the stopping
time at which the inventory is depleted. This simplifies the analysis.
We first show that the number of phases is growing slowly in n.
Lemma 1. For n ≥ 3, the total number of phases K ≤ 3 logn + 3.
We next show that the last phase takes the majority of the season.
Lemma 2. The total length of phases prior to phase K ,
∑K−1
k=1 τ
(k) is less than or
equal to T/2 for a sufficiently large n.
Consider the following events which are measurable with respect to Ftk :
Ak = ∩Mm=1
{
p∗m ∈ [p(k)m ,p
(k)
m ]
}
Bk =
{
z∗ ∈ [z(k), z(k)]
}
Ck = ∩Mm=1
{
Pm(z) ∈ [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] ∀z ∈ [z(k), z(k)]
}
By design,Ak and Bk are the key to the success of the algorithm. If in some phase
k , the interval estimators [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and [z(k), z(k)] do not contain p∗m and z∗, then
(8) and (9) do not make sense any more. To make things worse, the optimal pri-
mal/dual pair (p∗m, z∗) cannot be recovered in subsequent phases and the learning
policy is doomed to fail. Therefore, wewant to show thatAk∩Bk occurswith high
probability. The event Ck is also crucial. Note that to estimate z
∗, the algorithm
solves a discrete and empirical version of the dual function, i.e., (8). If Pm(z) does
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not fall into the interval estimator for some z, then maxjm=0,...,N (k ) dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm −z)
in (8) may provide a negatively biased estimator for Rm(z). As a result, the mini-
mization in (8) may not find the correct value.
From the definitions, it is easy to see that Ak ⊂ Bk ∩Ck . The following two
lemmas show that Bk and Ck occur with high probability.
Lemma 3. For k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, conditional on Bk ∩ Ck , P(Bk+1 |Bk ∩ Ck ) = 1 −
O(1/n).
Lemma 4. Conditional on Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1, P(Ck+1 |Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1) = 1 −O(1/n).
Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have the following lemma, which
states that at the beginning of phase K , the probability that the algorithm “goes
wrong” is negligible.
Lemma 5.
P
(
∩Kk=1 {Ak ∩ Bk ∩Ck }
)
= 1 −O((logn)2n−1).
The following two lemmas characterize the cumulative sales S(t) at t = tK ,
the beginning of phaseK . Recall that the cumulative sales S(tK ) can be expressed
as
∫ tK
0
∑M
m=1 dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))). Therefore, E[S(tK )] = nE[
∫ tK
0
∑M
m=1 dm(Pm(t))dt].
Also note that in the fluidmodel, the inventory level at tK isn
∑K−1
k=1 τ
(k)∑M
m=1 dm(p∗m).
Therefore, the next two lemma state that the cumulative sales process does not
deviate too much from that in the fluid system at the beginning of phase K .
Lemma 6. At the beginning of phase K , the conditional expectation of S(tK ) given
the pricing policy Pm(t) satisfies
P
(∫ tK0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt −
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 > n−1/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
= O((logn)2n−1).
Lemma 7. At the beginning of phase K , S(tK ) satisfies
P
(S(tK ) − n K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 > 2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
= O((logn)−2n−1/2).
Roughly speaking (ignoring the logarithmic terms), Lemma 6 and 7 show that
the inventory level at the beginning of phaseK misses the target inventory level
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in the fluid system by n3/4. This is consistent with the precision of the price
interval at tK , which satisfies ∆¯
(K ) ∼ n−1/4.
4.1. Sufficient Capacity
We next bound the regret when z∗ ≤ 0, i.e., when the capacity is not constrained.
Proposition 2.When z∗ ≤ 0, we have JDn −E[ J˜πn ] = O((logn)2+16ϵn1/2). Therefore,
Rπn (T , c) = O((logn)2+16ϵn−1/2).
The major steps of the proof are sketched below. We first express E[ J˜πn ] as
n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))dt
]
− pE
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)+]
.
(14)
The first term is the expected revenue generated in each phase, and the second
term accounts for the outsourcing cost explained in Remark 3. Moreover, JDn can
be expressed as
∑K
k=1 E
[∫ tk+1
tk
p∗mdm(p∗m)dt
]
. Thus, the difference between JDn and
the first term of (14) can thus be bounded by
n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
(
p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))
)
dt
]
∼n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
(
dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t))
)2
dt
]
∼ n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
(
p∗m − Pm(t)
)2
dt
]
∼n
K∑
k=1
τ (k)(∆¯(K ))2. (15)
Because p∗m is the unconstrained maximizer of pdm(p), we can apply a quadratic
bound in the second line by Assumption 1. The last line follows from the high-
probability event Ak , which implies that |Pm(t) − p∗m | ≤ ∆¯(k) in phase k ≤ K − 1.
At the beginning of phase K , we can show that Step 21 is triggered with high
probability. In this case, |Pm(t) − p∗m | = |p(K )m − p∗m | = |p(K )m − p∗m + α | ≤ ∆¯(K ) + α
is not necessarily bounded by ∆¯(K ). However, α is chosen carefully to match the
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order of ∆¯(K ). By the choice of the parameters, the order of n
∑K
k=1 τ
(k)(∆¯(K ))2 is
O((logn)2+16ϵn1/2).
To bound the second term of (14), we show that the mean of the total sales
over the horizon, nE
[∑M
m=1
∫ T
0
dm(Pm(t))dt
]
, does not exceednc. This is achieved
by charging a markup p
(K )
m = p
(K )
m + α in phase K and this is exactly the purpose
of introducing α . Since the random fluctuation of Poisson arrivals is bounded by
O(n1/2), we obtain the regret stated in Proposition 2.
4.2. Insufficient Capacity
When z∗ > 0, the inventory is depleted at T in the fluid system. We first show
that the cumulative sales at the end of the horizon under the algorithm misses
the target nc by O(n1/2).
Lemma 8.When z∗ > 0, we have
E[|S(T ) − nc |] = O((logn)ϵn1/2) (16)
and
E
[∫ T0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt − c

]
= O((logn)ϵn−1/2). (17)
The intuition behind the proof is explained below. We first show that D
(K )
l
andD
(K )
u estimaten
∑M
m=1 dm(plm) andn
∑M
m=1 dm(pum)with precisionn1/2 (ignoring
the logarithmic terms), because they are Poisson random variables with means
of order n and thus the standard deviations are O(n1/2). With such precision, θ
(Step 35) approximately solves
n(T − tK)
M∑
m=1
(θdm(plm) + (1 − θ )dm(pum)) ≈ nc − S(tK ).
Note that regardless of the firstK−1 phases, the remaining inventory isnc−S(tK)
at tK . Using p
l
m (p
u
m) for a fraction θ (1−θ ) of phaseK serves as a corrective force
to ensure the aggregate sales over the horizon to be close to nc (the error bound
(logn)ϵn1/2 is caused by the random fluctuation of the Poisson arrivals).
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Algorithm 1 does not explore the price space in phase K , and thus the preci-
sion of plm and p
u
m in Step 26 is of order n
−1/4. Therefore, one would expect the
sales to type-m customers miss the targetnTdm(p∗m) by n−1/4×n = n3/4. This is in-
deed the case. However, Lemma 8 guarantees that a simple exploration (Step 28,
32 and 35) is effective and leads to higher precision (O(n1/2) for the aggregate
sales of all types of customers. This is crucial to the proof of the next proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3.When z∗ > 0, we have JDn −E[ J˜πn ] = O((logn)2+18ϵn1/2). Therefore,
Rπn (T , c) = O((logn)2+18ϵn−1/2).
Different from Proposition 2,p∗m is not the unconstrainedmaximizer ofp∗mdm(p∗m)
when z∗ > 0. Therefore, if we follow (15), the difference is approximately
n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
(
p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))
)
dt
]
∼n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t))dt ] ∼ n K∑
k=1
τ (k)∆¯(K ) ∼ n3/4, (18)
which clearly does not meet our target n1/2. The remedy to this situation is the
following key observation. Let r ∗′m and r ∗′′m be the first- and second-order deriva-
tive of rm(λ) = λd−1m (λ) at λ = dm(p∗m). By Taylor’s expansion, the difference in
revenue rate can be expressed as
p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))
≤r ∗′m (dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t))) + |r ∗′′m |(dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t)))2.
Becauseλ = dm(p∗m)maximizes rm(λ)−λz∗ by the primal-dual formulation (Propo-
sition 1), the first-order condition implies r ∗′1 = r
∗′
2 = . . . = r
∗′
M = z
∗. Therefore,
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an improved bound for (18) can be derived:
n
K∑
k=1
E
[∫ tk+1
tk
(
p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))
)
dt
]
∼nz∗E
[∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t)))dt
]
+ nE
[∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
|r ∗′′m |(dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t)))2dt
]
∼nz∗E
[
c −
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
]
+M4nE
[∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t)))2dt
]
.
The first term can be bounded by (logn)ϵn1/2 by Lemma 8; this is the reason why
we need to bound the aggregate sales. The second term is of the same order as
n
∑K
k=1 τ
(k)(∆¯(K ))2 with high probability, which has been shown tomeet the target
in the remarks following Proposition 2.
Combining Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 and recalling that ϵ can be an
arbitrarily small constant, we obtain the main theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For any δ > 0, the primal-dual
learning algorithm can achieve regret
Rπn (T , c) = O((logn)2+δn−1/2).
By Besbes and Zeevi (2009), no learning policy can achieve regret that grows
slower than n−1/2 with M = 1. Therefore, ignoring the logarithmic terms, the
primal-dual learning algorithm achieves near-optimal regret.
5. Discussion
In this section, we discuss three salient features of the primal-dual learning algo-
rithm.
Learning in the Primal and Dual Spaces
The algorithm provides point and interval estimators for both the primal and
dual optimal solutions, p∗m and z∗, in each phase. It turns out that such learning
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is necessary, as the regret of a policy that only learns the primal space incurs
much higher regret (see, e.g., Section 4 of Besbes and Zeevi 2012). It is not sur-
prising given the primal-dual formulation in Section 2.1. The revenues collected
from different types of customers are only coupled through the inventory con-
straint. Therefore, having an accurate estimator for the dual optimal solution
z∗ helps to decouple the problem into M independent learning problems of the
form maxp dm(p)(p − z∗) for m = 1, . . . ,M . These independent learning prob-
lems are known to have regret O(n−1/2) (the discrete version of such problems
is solved in Keskin and Zeevi 2014; den Boer and Zwart 2014). However, z∗ is
not given upfront and has to be learned. The key design of the algorithm is to
nest the learning processes in the primal and dual spaces to narrow down the
primal/dual optimal solutions sequentially.
Controlling the Aggregate Sales
As explained in Section 3.2 and the remark following Proposition 3, when z∗ > 0,
the interval estimators forp∗m at the beginning of phaseK are still toowide (n
−1/4).
Instead of exploring the price space further and attempting to narrow down the
intervals in phaseK , the algorithm simply controls the aggregate sales within an
error margin of n1/2 (Step 25 to 40 in Algorithm 1 and Lemma 8). Focusing on
a single quantity (the aggregate sales) turns out much easier than controlling M
decision variables. In fact, we suspect that no learning policy could estimate all
p∗m with precision n−1/2 at the end of the horizon5.
Surprisingly, controlling the aggregate sales is sufficient to meet the target
regret, even though the estimators for the optimal prices are not precise enough.
The reason is explained by the remarks following Proposition 3. In particular,
the derivatives of the revenue rates λd−1m (λ) with respect to the demand rate λ
are all equal to z∗ at optimality λ = dm(p∗m) for m = 1, . . . ,M . This allows the
firm to control the regret by the deviation of the aggregate sales.
5The case we study is different from Wang et al. (2014), in which the market-clearing price
d−1(c/T ) can be learned with precision n−1/2. In our case, there are m types of customers and
there are stillm − 1 degrees of freedom when a vector of prices (p1, . . . ,pm) are market clearing.
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Overcoming the Curse of Dimensionality
As shown by Besbes and Zeevi (2012); Slivkins (2014), the dimension of the deci-
sion vector (M in this case) usually significantly complicates learning. Slivkins
(2014) shows that the regret for a generic learning problem (the objective is not
necessarily concave)with continuum-armed bandits is at leastO(n−1/(2+d))where
d is the dimension of the decision vector. In contrast, we are able to obtain a rate
n−1/2 whose exponent is independent of M , thus improving the regret n−1/(M+3)
in Besbes and Zeevi (2012), especially whenM is large.
To explain this observation, note that in our problem the objectives pdm(p)
form = 1, . . . ,M are only coupled by the inventory constraint and otherwise in-
dependent. In other words, if the dual optimal solution z∗ is given upfront, then
the learning problem is decomposed intoM independent ones, each with a single
decision variable. Therefore, the effective dimension of the learning problem is
one, equal to the dimension of the dual space. We believe this insight can be car-
ried over to a general network revenue management problem (Besbes and Zeevi,
2012), in which the dual space can be high-dimensional. In that case, the com-
plexity of learning may be determined by the minimum of the dimensions of the
primal and dual spaces.
Data Reuse
Across different phases, the interval estimators for the optimal pricep∗m may over-
lap for somem. In this case, the demand estimated at certain prices in the previ-
ous phases may be reused. For example, if [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and [p(k+1)m ,p
(k+1)
m ] overlap,
then for some j1 and j2 the price grid points p
(k)
m,j1
and p
(k+1)
m,j2
may be close, and
the demand estimate for p
(k)
m,j1
can provide useful information for p
(k+1)
m,j2
. In our
algorithm, the data from previous phases are not reused mainly for the analysis,
because data reuse introduces complex dependence between phases. In practice,
we believe that data reuse may facilitate the learning of the demand function and
increase the efficiency of the policy.
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Appendix A Table of Notations
Notation Meaning
c, T The initial inventory, the length of the selling season
n The scaling index
rm(λ) λd−1m (λ)
ϵ A small positive constant
K The total number of phases
τ (k) The length of phase k
tk The time of the beginning of phase k , tK+1 = T
Pm(t) The (stochastic) pricing policy for type-m customers at t
[p,p], [0, z] The domain for the primal/dual variables
[p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ], [z(k), z(k)] The intervals of primal/dual variables in phase k
∆
(k)
m , ∆
(k)
z The length of [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and [z(k), z(k)] after truncation
∆¯
(k), ∆¯(k)z The length of [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and [z(k), z(k)] before truncation
N (k) + 1, N (k)z + 1 The number of grid points in [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ] and [z(k), z(k)]
δ
(k)
m , δ
(k)
z The grid resolution, equal to ∆
(k)
m /N (k) and ∆(k)z /N (k)z
p
(k)
m,j The jth price on the grid, p
(k)
m
+ jδ
(k)
m
D
(k)
m,j The realized demand of typem in phase k for price p
(k)
m,j
dˆ
(k)
m,j The empirical estimate for dm(p(k)m,j )
z
(k)
j The jth dual variable on the grid, z
(k)
+ jδ
(k)
z
z(k)∗ The dual optimal solution on the primal/dual grids
using the empirical estimates for dm(·)
p
(k)∗
m The primal optimal solution on the price grids using the
dual variable z(k)∗ and the empirical estimates for dm(·)
Nm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) The Poisson arrival process of type-m customers
Ak The event ∩Mm=1{p∗m ∈ [p(k)m ,p
(k)
m ]}
Bk The event {z∗ ∈ [z(k), z(k)]}
Ck The event ∩Mm=1{Pm(z) ∈ [p(k)m ,p
(k)
m ] ∀z ∈ [z(k), z(k)]}
Table 1: A summary of notations.
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Appendix B Proofs
We first provide two lemmas and their proofs that will be used repeatedly in the
proof of the main result.
Lemma 9. Suppose rn ≥ nβ with β > 0. If ϵn = (logn)1/2+ηr−1/2n for η > 0, then
for all n ≥ 1,
P(|N (rn) − rn | > rnϵn) ≤
C
nk
,
where N (µ) is a Poisson random variable with mean µ andC is a constant indepen-
dent of n.
Proof of Lemma 9: This is a corollary of Lemma 2 in the online companion of
Besbes and Zeevi (2009). 
Lemma 10. Suppose X is a Poisson random variable with mean λ, then we have
E [|X − λ|] ≤
√
λ.
Proof of Lemma 10. Note that Var(X ) = λ. Applying the Cauchy-Schwartz in-
equality, we have
E[|X − λ|] ≤ E[(X − λ)2]1/2 =
√
λ.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider λm(z) , maxλ
{
λ(d−1m (λ) − z)
}
. Then Pm(z) =
d−1m (λm(z)). To show that Pm(z) is increasing in z and P′m(z) is bounded in part
one, it suffices to show that λm(z) is decreasing in z and λ′m(z) is bounded. The
first-order condition for maximizing λ(d−1m (λ) − z) yields
z = r ′m(λ) =⇒ (λ−1m (λ))′ = r ′′m(λ).
Becauserm(·) is concavewith a second-order derivative bounded above by−M3 <
0 by Assumption 1, λ−1m is decreasing whose first-order derivative is bounded
above by [−M4,−M3]. This implies that λm(·) is strictly decreasing in z whose
first-order derivative is bounded below by −1/M3. Thus, we conclude that Pm(z)
is strictly increasing and the derivative is bounded.
Part two follows from the envelop theorem and the fact that dm(·) is strictly
decreasing by Assumption 1 and the proof of part one.
For part three, note that д(z) = cz + T ∑Mm=1 Rm(z). Since Rm(z) is twice
differentiable and convex by part two, the claim follows.
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For part four, note that the objective function is concave and the constraint is
linear in dm(pm(t)). Therefore, Slater’s condition implies strong duality and com-
plementary slackness. The proofs can also be found in Gallego and Topaloglu
(2018). 
Proof of Lemma 1: From the expression of ∆¯(k) and K , we have
(∆¯(K ))2 = n−(1/2)(1−(3/5)K−1) ≤ n−1/2(logn)2+16ϵ
=⇒ K ≤ log5/3
logn
(4 + 32ϵ) log logn + 2 ≤ log5/3
logn
10 log logn
+ log5/3(5/2) + 2,
because ϵ > 0. It has been shown in the proof of Lemma 2 in Wang et al. (2014)
that
log5/3
logn
10 log logn
+ 1 ≤ 3 logn.
Therefore, K ≤ 3 logn + 3 
Proof of Lemma 2: By the choices ofK and ∆¯(k), we have (∆¯(K−1))2 > n−1/2(logn)2+16ϵ ,
and thus n1/2×(3/5)
K−2 ≥ (logn)2+16ϵ . This implies that τ (K−1) ≤ (logn)−1−ϵ . It is
clear that τ (i) is increasing in i. Thus by Lemma1,
∑K−1
i=1 τ
(i) ≤ (K−1)(logn)−1−ϵ ≤
4(logn)−ϵ ≤ T/2 for a sufficiently large n. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Wewill bound the probability ofBc
k+1
, the complement ofBk+1.
Note that the width of [z(k+1), z(k+1)] is ∆(k+1)z and the middle point before trun-
cation is z(k)∗. Therefore, when Bc
k+1
occurs, it implies that6
|z∗ − z(k)∗ | > ∆¯(k+1)z /2. (19)
In phase k , let j¯ be the index of the grid point for z(k)∗. That is, z(k)∗ = z(k) + j¯δ (k)z .
Let j∗ be the index of the grid point in [z(k), z(k)] that is closest to z∗ among all
grid points. Conditional on Bk , we have z
∗ ∈ [z(k), z(k)]. Hence
|z(k) + j∗δ (k)z − z∗ | = |z(k)j∗ − z∗ | ≤ δ
(k)
z /2. (20)
where z
(k)
j , z
(k)
+ jδ
(k)
z . According to the way z
(k)∗ is defined (see Step 16 in the
6If [z(k)∗ − ∆¯(k+1)z /2, z(k)∗ + ∆¯(k+1)z /2] is not truncated by [0, z¯], then ∆¯(k+1)z = ∆(k+1)z and thus
(19) holds. Otherwise, because z∗ ∈ [0, z], we still have (19).
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algorithm and (8)),
cz
(k)
j¯
+T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm−z
(k)
j¯
) ≤ cz(k)j∗ +T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm−z
(k)
j∗ ).
(21)
Furthermore, (19), (20) and (21) imply that
Bck+1 =⇒
(
cz
(k)
j∗ +T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) − д(z
(k)
j∗ )
)
−
(
cz
(k)
j¯
+T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j¯
) − д(z(k)
j¯
)
)
≥ д(z(k)
j¯
) − д(z(k)j∗ ) = (д(z
(k)
j¯
) − д(z∗)) − (д(z(k)j∗ ) − д(z∗))
≥ M3(z(k)j¯ − z
∗)2 −M4(z(k)j∗ − z∗)2
≥ M3
4
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
4
(δ (k)z )2
The last but one inequality is due to Remark 2; the last inequality is due to (19) and
(20). If the difference of two terms is bounded below by M34 (∆¯
(k+1)
z )2 − M44 (δ
(k)
z )2,
then it implies that either the first term is greater than or equal to M38 (∆¯
(k+1)
z )2 −
M4
8 (δ
(k)
z )2, or the second term is less than or equal to −M38 (∆¯
(k+1)
z )2 + M48 (δ
(k)
z )2.
Therefore, noting that Bk ∩Ck ∈ Ftk and taking the union on j¯, we have
P(Bck+1 |Bk ∩Ck ) = E
[
P(Bck+1 |Ftk )|Bk ∩Ck
]
≤ E
[
P
(
∪N
(k )
z
j¯=0
{
cz
(k)
j∗ +T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) − д(z
(k)
j∗ )
≥ M3
8
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
8
(δ (k)z )2
}Ftk )Bk ∩Ck ]
+ E
[
P
(
∪N
(k )
z
j¯=0
{
cz
(k)
j¯
+T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j¯
) − д(z(k)
j¯
)
≤ −M3
8
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 +
M4
8
(δ (k)z )2
}Ftk )Bk ∩Ck ] . (22)
By the union bound, the term in the first expectation of (22) is bounded above
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by
P
(
∪N
(k )
z
j¯=0
{
cz
(k)
j∗ +T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) − д(z
(k)
j∗ )
≥ M3
8
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
8
(δ (k)z )2
}Ftk )
≤(N (k)z + 1)P
(
T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) −T
M∑
m=1
max
pm∈[p,p]
dm(pm)(pm − z(k)j∗ )
≥ M3
8
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
8
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk )
≤(N (k)z + 1)P
(
T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) −T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)j∗ )
≥ M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk )
+ (N (k)z + 1)P
(
T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)j∗ ) −T
M∑
m=1
max
pm∈[p,p]
dm(pm)(pm − z(k)j∗ )
≥ M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk ), (23)
where in the last inequality, we have used the fact that {a + b > c} ⊂ {a >
c/2}∪{b > c/2} and the union bound again. For the two probabilities in (23), the
first one is attributed to the stochastic error : conditional on Ftk , dˆ(k)m,jm is a Poisson
random variable which may deviate from its meandm(p(k)m,jm ). It is bounded above
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by
(N (k)z + 1)P
(
∪
j∈{0,...,N (k )}M
{
T
M∑
m=1
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) −T
M∑
m=1
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)j∗ )
≥ M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
}Ftk )
≤(N (k)z + 1)
∑
j∈{0,...,N (k )}M
P
(
T
M∑
m=1
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) −T
M∑
m=1
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)j∗ )
≥ M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk )
≤(N (k)z + 1)
∑
j∈{0,...,N (k )}M
M∑
m=1
P
(
Tdˆ
(k)
m,jm
(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ ) −Tdm(p
(k)
m,jm
)(p(k)m,jm − z
(k)
j∗ )
≥ M3
16M
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
16M
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk )
≤(N (k)z + 1)
∑
j∈{0,...,N (k )}M
M∑
m=1
P
(
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
− dm(p(k)m,jm ) ≥
M3
16MT (p + z)(∆¯
(k+1)
z )2
− M4
16MT (p + z)(δ
(k)
z )2
Ftk ) (24)
By the choice of parameters, for a sufficiently large n, we have M4(δ (k)z )2 ≤
M3(∆¯(k+1)z )2(logn)−ϵ ≤ M3(∆¯(k+1)z )2/2. Therefore, for a sufficiently large n and
the parameter values chosen in Section 3.3, we have
M3
16MT (p + z) (∆¯
(k+1)
z )2 −
M4
16MT (p + z)(δ
(k)
z )2 ≥
M3
32MT (p + z)(∆¯
(k+1)
z )2
≥ (logn)−5ϵn−(1/2)(1−(3/5)k ) ≥ (logn)1/2+ϵ
(
N (k) + 1
nτ (k)
)1/2
.
Also note that the Poisson random variable D
(k)
m,j conditional on Ftk satisfies
dˆ
(k)
m,j ,
N (k) + 1
nτ (k)
D
(k)
m,j , E[D(k)m,j ] =
nτ (k)
N (k) + 1
dm(p(k)m,jm ).
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Therefore, applying Lemma 9, we have
P
(
dˆ
(k)
m,jm
−dm(p(k)m,jm ) ≥
M3
16MT (p + z)(∆¯
(k+1)
z )2−
M4
16MT (p + z)(δ
(k)
z )2
Ftk ) = O(n−(1+2M)).
Thus, (24) and thus the first term of (23) can be bounded
(24) ≤ M(N (k)z + 1)(N (k) + 1)M ×O
(
n−(1+2M)
)
= O(n−1).
The second equality is due to the fact that N (k) = O(n) and N (k)z = O(n) for all k .
The second probability in (23) is attributed to the discretization error, as we
only sample discrete prices to find the optimal solution. The second probability
is zero, because the optimal value is always greater than the discretized one given
that M316 (∆¯
(k+1)
z )2 − M416 (δ
(k)
z )2 > 0 for a sufficiently large n.
For the second term in (22), we can decompose it into the stochastic error
and the discretization error similar to (23). The stochastic error can be bounded
by O(n−1) similarly. For the discretization error, we are going to bound
N
(k )
z∑¯
j=0
P
(
T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)
j¯
) −T
M∑
m=1
max
pm∈[p,p]
dm(pm)(pm − z(k)j¯ )
≤ −M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 +
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk )
conditional on Bk∩Ck . Let j¯m be the index for the grid pointp(k)m,j¯m that is closest to
Pm(z(k)j¯ ). Conditional onCk , the distance between p
(k)
m,j¯m
and Pm(z(k)j¯ ), which falls
into [p(k)
m
,p
(k)
m ], is at most δ (k)m /2. By the strict concavity and Lipschitz continuity
in Assumption 1,
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)
j¯
) − max
pm∈[p,p]
dm(pm)(pm − z(k)j¯ )
≥ −M4(dm(p(k)m,j¯m ) − dm(p
∗
m(z(k)j¯ )))
2 ≥ −M4M22 (p(k)m,j¯m − p
∗
m(z(k)j¯ ))
2
≥ − M4M
2
2
4
(δ (k)m )2
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By the choice of parameters, the grid size is sufficiently small, and thus
T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)
j¯
) −T
M∑
m=1
max
pm∈[p,p]
dm(pm)(pm − z(k)j¯ )
≥ − TMM4M
2
2
4
(δ (k)m )2 ≥ −n−(1/2)(1−(3/5)
k )(logn)−5ϵ ≥ −(logn)−ϵ/2M3
32
(∆¯(k+1)z )2
≥ − (logn)−ϵ/2
(
M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 −
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
)
> −M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 +
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2.
for a sufficiently largen. In otherwords, ifn is sufficiently large, the discretization
error
N
(k )
z∑¯
j=0
P
(
T
M∑
m=1
max
jm=0,...,N (k )
dm(p(k)m,jm )(p
(k)
m,jm
− z(k)
j¯
) −T
M∑
m=1
max
pm∈[p,p]
dm(pm)(pm − z(k)j¯ )
≤ −M3
16
(∆¯(k+1)z )2 +
M4
16
(δ (k)z )2
Ftk ) = 0
conditional on Bk ∩Ck . Therefore, we have proved the result. 
Proof of Lemma 4: Denote the following event by Dk ,m
Dk ,m , |p(k)∗m − p∗m | ≤ (logn)−ϵ ∆¯(k+1)
We first show that with probability 1 − O(1/n), ∩Mm=1Dk ,m occurs. Let j¯m be the
index of the grid point for p
(k)∗
m . Let j
∗
m be the index of the grid point that is closest
to p∗m . When D
c
k ,m
occurs, we have
|p∗m − p(k)∗m | = |p∗m − p(k)m,j¯m | > (logn)
−ϵ
∆¯
(k+1)
. (25)
Conditional on Ak ⊂ Bk ∩Ck , p∗m falls into [p(k)m ,p
(k)
m ], and thus it is at most δ (k)m /2
away from the closest grid point:
|p∗m − p(k)m,j∗m | ≤ δ
(k)
m /2. (26)
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Therefore, by the definition of p
(k)∗
m , we have
dˆ
(k)
m,j¯m
(p(k)
m,j¯m
− z(k)∗) ≥ dˆ(k)
m,j∗m
(p(k)
m,j∗m
− z(k)∗)
=⇒ (dˆ(k)
m,j¯m
− dm(p(k)m,j¯m ))(p
(k)
m,j¯m
− z(k)∗) − (dˆ(k)
m,j∗m
− dm(p(k)m,j∗m ))(p
(k)
m,j∗m
− z(k)∗)
≥ dm(p(k)m,j∗m )(p
(k)
m,j∗m
− z(k)∗) − dm(p(k)m,j¯m )(p
(k)
m,j¯m
− z(k)∗)
= (dm(p(k)m,j∗m ) − dm(p
(k)
m,j¯m
))(z∗ − z(k)∗) + dm(p(k)m,j∗m )(p
(k)
m,j∗m
− z∗) − dm(p(k)m,j¯m )(p
(k)
m,j¯m
− z∗)
= (dm(p(k)m,j∗m ) − dm(p
(k)
m,j¯m
))(z∗ − z(k)∗) + dm(p(k)m,j∗m )(p
(k)
m,j∗m
− z∗) − dm(p∗m)(p∗m − z∗)
+ dm(p∗m)(p∗m − z∗) − dm(p(k)m,j¯m )(p
(k)
m,j¯m
− z∗). (27)
The left-hand side of (27) is the stochastic error caused by the Poisson arrival.
We are going to show that if Dc
k ,m
occurs, then the right-hand side is large so (27)
occurs with small probability.
Because of Assumption 1 and (26), part of the right-hand side of (27) can be
bounded by
dm(p(k)m,j∗m )(p
(k)
m,j∗m
− z∗) − dm(p∗m)(p∗m − z∗) ≥ −M4(p(k)m,j∗m − p
∗
m)2 ≥ −
M4
4
(δ (k)m )2
Moreover,
(dm(p(k)m,j∗m ) − dm(p
(k)
m,j¯m
))(z∗ − z(k)∗) + dm(p∗m)(p∗m − z∗) − dm(p(k)m,j¯m )(p
(k)
m,j¯m
− z∗)
≥ −M−12 |p(k)m,j∗m − p
(k)
m,j¯m
| |z∗ − z(k)∗ | +M3(dm(p(k)m,j¯m ) − dm(p
∗
m))2
≥ −M−12 |p(k)m,j∗m − p
(k)
m,j¯m
| |z∗ − z(k)∗ | +M3M−22 (p(k)m,j¯m − p
∗
m)2 (28)
In the first inequality, we use Lipschitz continuity (Assumption 1) for the first
term; for the second term, note that dm(p∗m) maximizes λ(d−1m (λ) − z∗) and its
second-order derivative is bounded between [−M4,−M3] by Assumption 1. The
second inequality follows from the Lipschitz continuity (Assumption 1). Because
j∗m is the closest grid point to p∗m , we have
|p(k)
m,j∗m
− p(k)
m,j¯m
| ≤ |p∗m − p(k)m,j¯m | + |p
(k)
m,j∗m
− p∗m | ≤ 2|p∗m − p(k)m,j¯m |.
Therefore, if Dc
k ,m
occurs, then
(28) ≥|p∗m − p(k)m,j¯m |(M3M
−2
2 |p∗m − p(k)m,j¯m | − 2M
−1
2 |z∗ − z(k)∗ |)
≥ ∆¯
(k+1)
(logn)2ϵ
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
.
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In the inequality, we have used the fact that |z∗ − z(k)∗ | ≤ ∆¯(k+1)z conditional on
Bk+1. Therefore, we have
P(Dck ,m |Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1)
≤P
(
∪N (k )
j¯m=0
{
(dˆ(k)
m,j¯m
− dm(p(k)m,j¯m ))(p
(k)
m,j¯m
− z(k)∗) − (dˆ(k)
m,j∗m
− dm(p(k)m,j∗m ))(p
(k)
m,j∗m
− z(k)∗)
≥ ∆¯
(k+1)
(logn)2ϵ
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
− M4
4
(δ (k)m )2
}Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1)
≤
N (k )∑
j=0
P
(
dˆ
(k)
m,j − dm(p(k)m,j ) ≥
∆¯
(k+1)
2(p + z)(logn)2ϵ
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
− M4
8(p + z)(δ
(k)
m )2
Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1) + (N (k) + 1)P(dˆ(k)m,j∗m − dm(p(k)m,j∗m )
≤ − ∆¯
(k+1)
2(logn)2ϵ (p + z)
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
+
M4
8(p + z)(δ
(k)
m )2
Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1), (29)
where the second inequality follows from |p(k)m,j − z(k)∗ | ≤ p + z. By Lemma 3,
P(Bk+1 |Bk∩Ck ) = 1−O(n−1). Therefore, P(·|Bk∩Ck∩Bk+1)−P(·|Bk∩Ck ) = O(n−1).
Therefore, by the fact that Bk ∩Ck ∈ Ftk , the first probability of (29) is bounded
above by
N (k )∑
j=0
P
(
dˆ
(k)
m,j − dm(p(k)m,j ) ≥
∆¯
(k+1)
2(p + z)(logn)2ϵ
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
− M4
8(p + z)(δ
(k)
m )2
Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1)
≤
N (k )∑
j=0
E
[
P
(
dˆ
(k)
m,j − dm(p(k)m,j) ≥
∆¯
(k+1)
2(p + z)(logn)2ϵ
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
− M4
8(p + z)(δ
(k)
m )2
Ftk )Bk ∩Ck ] +O(n−1). (30)
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For a sufficiently large n, we have ∆¯(k+1) ≥ (logn)2ϵδ (k)m and thus
∆¯
(k+1)
2(p + z)(logn)2ϵ
(
M3M
−2
2 ∆¯
(k+1) − 2M−12 (logn)ϵ ∆¯(k+1)z
)
+
− M4
8(p + z)(δ
(k)
m )2
≥M3M
−2
2 (∆¯(k+1))2
4(p + z)(logn)2ϵ −
M4
8(p + z)(δ
(k)
m )2 ≥
M3M
−2
2 (∆¯(k+1))2
8(p + z)(logn)2ϵ
≥(logn)−3ϵn−(1/2)(1−(3/5)k ) ≥ (logn)1/2+ϵ
(
N (k) + 1
nτ (k)
)1/2
.
Note that conditional on Ftk , D(k)m,j is a Poisson random variable and
dˆ
(k)
m,j ,
N (k) + 1
nτ (k)
D
(k)
m,j , E[D(k)m,j] =
nτ (k)
N (k) + 1
dm(p(k)m,j).
Therefore, by Lemma 9, we have that (30) is O(n−1) and so is the second proba-
bility of (29). Hence P(Dc
k ,m
|Bk ∩Ck ∩ Bk+1) = O(n−1) and P(∩Mm=1Dk ,m |Bk ∩Ck ∩
Bk+1) = 1 −O(n−1).
Next we show that conditional on ∩Mm=1Dk ,m and Bk+1, P(Ck+1) = 1 −O(n−1).
By Remark 2, for z ∈ [z(k+1), z(k+1)],
|Pm(z) − p∗m | = |Pm(z) − Pm(z∗)| ≤ M2 |z − z∗ | ≤ M2∆¯(k+1)z ,
where we have used the fact that z∗ ∈ [z(k+1), z(k+1)] conditional on Bk+1. Condi-
tional on Dk ,m , we have
|Pm(z) − p(k)∗m | ≤ |Pm(z) − p∗m | + |p∗m − p(k)∗m | ≤ M2∆¯(k+1)z + (logn)−ϵ ∆¯(k+1) ≤ ∆¯(k+1)
for a sufficiently large n. Therefore, we have shown that for all z ∈ [z(k+1), z(k+1)],
Pm(z) ∈ [p(k+1)
m
,p
(k+1)
m ] with probability 1 −O(n−1) and this completes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 5: Note that because Ak ⊂ Bk ∩Ck , we have
P
({∩Kk=1 {Ak ∩ Bk ∩Ck }}}c ) = P (∪Kk=1 {Bck ∪Cck}) ≤ K∑
k=1
P
(
Bck ∪Cck
)
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Note that by Assumption 2, P(Bc1 ∪Cc1) = 0. For k ≥ 2, we have
P
(
Bck ∪Cck
) ≤ P(Bck ∪Cck |Bk−1 ∩Ck−1)P(Bk−1 ∩Ck−1) + P(Bck−1 ∪Cck−1)
≤ P(Bck |Bk−1 ∩Ck−1) + P(Bk ∩Cck−1 |Bk−1 ∩Ck−1) + P(Bck−1 ∪Cck−1)
≤ P(Bck |Bk−1 ∩Ck−1) + P(Cck−1 |Bk ∩ Bk−1 ∩Ck−1) + P(Bck−1 ∪Cck−1)
which implies P
(
Bc
k
∪Cc
k
)
− P(Bc
k−1 ∪Cck−1) = O(1/n) by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Repeating the process until k = 2, we have P
(
Bc
k
∪Cc
k
)
= k ×O(1/n). Therefore,
by the fact that k ≤ K = O(logn) from Lemma 1, we have
K∑
k=1
P
(
Bc
k
∪Cc
k
)
K2
≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
P
(
Bc
k
∪Cc
k
)
i
= O(1/n)
=⇒
K∑
k=1
P
(
Bck ∪Cck
)
= O((logn)2/n).
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 6: If the event ∩K
k=1
Ak occurs, then we have
|Pm(t) − p∗m | ≤ ∆¯(k) = n−(1/4)(1−(3/5)
k−1)
,
for t ∈ (tk , tk+1]. Therefore, ∩Kk=1Ak implies that∫ tK
0
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt −
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m) ≤M2
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
|Pm(t) − p∗m |
≤M2M
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)∆¯(k).
By the choice of parameters, ∆¯(k) ≥ n−1/2(logn)2+16ϵ for k ≤ K − 1, which
implies that n1/4×(3/5)
k−1 ≥ (logn)1+8ϵ for k ≤ K − 1. Moreover, τ (k)∆¯(k) ≤
n−1/4(1+(3/5)
k−1)(logn)1+15ϵ ≤ n−1/4(logn)7ϵ . Therefore, by Lemma 1,
M2M
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)∆¯(k) ≤ M2MKn−1/4(logn)7ϵ = O(n−1/4(logn)1+7ϵ ) < n−1/4(logn)1+8ϵ
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for a sufficiently large n. Therefore,
P
(∫ tK0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt −
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 > n−1/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
≤1 − P(∩Kk=1Ak ) = O((logn)2/n)
by Lemma 5. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 7: Note that S(t) can be expressed as
S(t) =
∫ tK
0
M∑
m=1
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))).
Substituting it into Lemma 7, it suffices to show
P
(∫ tK0 M∑m=1dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − n
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 > 2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
(31)
is O((logn)2n−1/2). By the triangle inequality and the union bound, we have
(31) ≤P
(∫ tK0 M∑m=1dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − n
∫ tK
0
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
 > n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
+ P
(∫ tK0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt −
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 > n−1/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
(32)
The second term is O((logn)2/n) shown by Lemma 6. The first term can be
bounded by
P
(∫ tK0 M∑m=1dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − n
∫ tK
0
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
 > n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
)
≤
K−1∑
k=1
P
(∫ tk+1tk
M∑
m=1
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − n
∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
 > n3/4(logn)1+8ϵK
)
≤
K−1∑
k=1
1
n3/2(logn)2+16ϵ E

(∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − n
∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
)2 ,
where the last inequality follows from Chebyshev’s inequality. Now note that
conditional onFtk , Pm(t) for t ∈ (tk , tk+1] is measurable and thus
∫ tk+1
tk
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t)))
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is a Poisson random variable with mean n
∫ tk+1
tk
dm(Pm(t))dt . Therefore,
E

(∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − n
∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
)2 Ftk 
=n
∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt ≤ nTMM1,
by Assumption 1. Thus, the first term of (32) can be bounded by
K−1∑
k=1
nTMM1
n3/2(logn)2+16ϵ ≤ KTMM1n
−1/2(logn)−2−16ϵ = O(n−1/2(logn)−2).
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The total revenue J˜πn can be expressed as the sales revenue
minus the outsourcing cost:
E
[
J˜πn
]
= E
[∫ T
0
Pm(t)dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t)))
]
− pE
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)
+
]
= nE
[∫ T
0
Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))dt
]
− pE
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)
+
]
=
K∑
k=1
nE
[∫ tk+1
tk
Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))dt
]
− pE
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)
+
]
≕
K∑
k=1
E[ J˜πn,k] − pE
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)
+
]
, (33)
wherewe use J˜π
n,k
to denote the revenue earned in phasek (ignoring the inventory
constraint). First note that
E
[
J˜πn,k
Ak ] − E [ J˜πn,k ] ≤P(Ack )E [ J˜πn,k Ack ]
≤O((logn)2n−1) × E
[
E
[
J˜πn,k
Ftk ] Ack ] = O((logn)2) (34)
The second inequality follows from P(Ac
k
) = O((logn)2n−1) by Lemma 5, the
tower property and the fact that Ac
k
∈ Ftk . The last bound is due to the fact that
E
[
J˜π
n,k
Ftk ] is the mean of a Poisson random variable which is bounded above by
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MM1pτ
(k)n.
Since the difference is negligible compared to our target n1/2, it suffices to
study E
[
J˜π
n,k
Ak ] . Conditional onAk , we have |Pm(t)−p∗m | ≤ ∆¯(k) = n−(1/4)(1−(3/5)k−1)
for t ∈ (tk , tk+1] and k ≤ K − 1. Note that the revenue generated in the fluid sys-
tem using p∗m in phase k is nτ (k)
∑M
m=1 p
∗
mdm(p∗m). Therefore, for k ≤ K − 1,
nτ (k)
M∑
m=1
p∗mdm(p∗m) − E
[
J˜πn,k
Ak ] ≤ nE [∫ tk+1
tk
(p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t)))dt |Ak
]
≤ nM4τ (k)(∆¯(k))2 = O(n1/2(logn)1+15ϵ ). (35)
The last inequality is because of the fact that z∗ ≤ 0 and thus p∗m maximizes
p∗mdm(p∗m). The quadratic bound then follows from Assumption 1.
For k = K , note that conditional on BK , Step 21 is triggered when n is suffi-
ciently large. Therefore, conditional on AK ∩ BK , the charged price p(K )m in phase
K for type-m customers satisfies |p(K )m −p∗m | ≤ ∆¯(K )+α ≤ 2(logn)1+9ϵn−1/4. There-
fore,
nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
p∗mdm(p∗m) − E
[
J˜πn,K
]
≤nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
p∗mdm(p∗m) − E
[
J˜πn,K
AK ∩ BK ] + P(AcK ∪ BcK )E [ J˜πn,K AcK ∪ BcK ]
≤nM4τ (K )(∆¯(K ) + α)2 +O((logn)2) = O((logn)2+18ϵn1/2). (36)
The second inequality follows from a similar argument below (34). Therefore,
adding up (35) for all K − 1 phases and (36), we have obtained that
JDn −
K∑
k=1
E
[
J˜πn,k
]
= O(n1/2(logn)2+18ϵ ). (37)
From (33), it remains to bound E
[(∑M
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)
+
]
by the
same order. Consider the event
EK , AK ∩
{S(tK ) − n K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 < 2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
}
.
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By Lemma 5 and Lemma 7, the probability of Ec
K
is O(n−1/2). Therefore,
E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)
+
]
≤E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)+
IEK
]
+ E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) + nc
)
IEc
K
]
≤E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)+
IEK
]
+
©­­«E

(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t)))
)2
1/2
+ nc
ª®®¬ P(E
c
k )
≤E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)+
IEK
]
+
(√
(MM1Tn)2 +MM1Tn + nc
)
P(EcK )
≤E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)+
IEK
]
+C1n
1/2
,
for some constant C1. The third inequality follows from the mean and variance
Poisson random variables. When EK ⊂ AK occurs, the prices set in phase K
satisfy (recall that α = (logn)1+9ϵn−1/4 by Section 3.3)
α ≤ p(K )m − p∗m ≤ ∆¯(K ) + α ≤ 2(logn)1+9ϵn−1/4,
according to the definition ofp
(K )
m andAssumption 2. Moreover, by Assumption 1,
dm(p∗m) − dm(p(K )m ) ≥ M−12 (p(K )m − p∗m) ≥ M−12 α = M−12 (logn)1+9ϵn−1/4. Therefore,
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combining with the fact that c ≥ T ∑Mm=1 dm(p∗m), we have
E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nc
)+
IEK
]
≤E
[(
M∑
m=1
∫ T
0
dNm,t (ndm(Pm(t))) − nT
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
)+
IEK
]
=E
[(
S(tK ) − n
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m) +
M∑
m=1
∫ T
tK
dNm,t (ndm(p(K )m )) − nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
)+
IEK
]
≤E
[(
2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ +
M∑
m=1
∫ T
tK
dNm,t (ndm(p(K )m )) − nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
)+
IEK
]
≤E
[(
2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ −M−12 M(logn)1+9ϵn3/4τ (K ) +
M∑
m=1
∫ T
tK
dNm,t (ndm(p(K )m ))
− nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
dm(p(K )m )
)
+
IEK
]
. (38)
The first inequality is due to c ≥ T ∑Mm=1 dm(p∗m). The second inequality is due
to EK . In the third inequality we replace dm(p∗m) by dm(p(K )m ) and use the bound
derived before. Note that conditional on FtK , Nm,t (ndm(p(K )m )) is a Poisson process
with rate ndm(p(K )m ). Therefore, for a sufficiently large n
(38) ≤ E
[( M∑
m=1
∫ T
tK
dNm,t (ndm(p(K )m )) − nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
dm(p(K )m )
)
+
]
= E
[
E
[( M∑
m=1
∫ T
tK
dNm,t (ndm(p(K )m )) − nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
dm(p(K )m )
)
+
FtK ] ]
≤ E
[ (
nτ (K )
M∑
m=1
dm(p(K )m )
)1/2 ]
= O(n1/2).
The first inequality is due to the fact that 2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ−M−12 M(logn)1+9ϵn3/4τ (K ) ≤
0 for a sufficiently largen. The second line is due to the tower property. The third
line follows from Lemma 10. Combining the above result with (37) and (33), we
have proved Proposition 2. 
Proof of Lemma 8: Note that conditional on BK , Step 25 of the algorithm is trig-
gered for a sufficiently large n. Because P(BK ) occurs with high probability (rela-
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tive to the target regret), in the following we simply assume the algorithm enters
Step 25 in order to simplify the notation. We first bound the estimation error of
D
(K )
l
and D
(K )
u . Conditional on FtK , plm and pum are deterministic and (logn)−ϵD(K )l
is a Poisson random variable with mean n(logn)−ϵ ∑Mm=1 dm(plm). By Lemma 9,
we have
P
((logn)−ϵD(K )l − n(logn)−ϵ M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
 > log(n)n1/2FtK ) = O(1/n). (39)
Similarly,
P
((logn)−ϵD(K )u − n(logn)−ϵ M∑
m=1
dm(pum)
 > log(n)n1/2FtK ) = O(1/n). (40)
Introduce the event
EK = AK ∩ BK ∩
{S(tK ) − n K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m)
 < 2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
}
∈ FtK .
By Lemma 5 and Lemma 7, P(Ec
K
) = O(n−1/2). Next we will show that conditional
on EK , θ ∈ (0, 1) with high probability for a sufficiently large n. Introduce θ0,
which solves
n(T − tK)
M∑
m=1
(θ0dm(plm) + (1 − θ0)dm(pum)) = nc − S(tK ).
θ0 is regarded as the “expected” version of θ compared to (13). Observe that on
Ek we have
nc − S(tK ) −n(T − tK)∑Mm=1 dm(p∗m) < 2n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ . Moreover, on
AK , p
∗
m ∈ [p(K )m ,p
(K )
m ], and thus α ≤ p∗m − plm and α ≤ pum − p∗m where recall that
α = (logn)1+9ϵn−1/4. Therefore,∑Mm=1(dm(plm) −dm(p∗m)) ≥ M−12 ∑Mm=1(p∗m −plm) ≥
M−12 M(logn)1+9ϵn−1/4 and
∑M
m=1(dm(p∗m) − dm(pum)) ≥ M−12 M(logn)1+9ϵn−1/4. For
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a sufficiently large n, we have
n(T − tK)
M∑
m=1
dm(plm) > n(T − tK)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m) + 3n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
> nc − S(tK ) + n3/4
n(T − tK)
M∑
m=1
dm(pum) < n(T − tK)
M∑
m=1
dm(p∗m) − 3n3/4(logn)1+8ϵ
< nc − S(tK ) − n3/4
Therefore,
θ0 =
nc − S(tK ) − n(T − tK)
∑M
m=1 dm(pum)
n(T − tK)
∑M
m=1(dm(plm) − dm(pum))
∈ (c1n−1/4, 1 − c2n−1/4), (41)
for some positive constants c1 and c2. Now by (39) and (40), with probability
1 −O(1/n) we have{D(K )l − n M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
 < (logn)1+ϵn1/2} ∩ {D(K )u − n M∑
m=1
dm(pum)
 < (logn)1+ϵn1/2}
Since the order of the numerator and denominator of θ0 in (41) is n
3/4, replacing
n
∑M
m=1 dm(pum) and n
∑M
m=1 dm(plm) by D(K )u and D(K )l , which are within an error
bound of (logn)1+ϵn1/2, does not significantly change the value of θ0 for a suffi-
ciently large n. Thus, we have
θ =
nc − S(tK ) − (T − tK)D(K )u
(T − tK)(D(K )l − D
(k)
u )
∈ (0, 1).
with probability P(EK ) = 1 −O(n−1/2).
To prove (16), note that conditional on FtK , by Step 28, Step 32, Step 37 and
Step 40 in the algorithm, S(T ) − S(tK ) can be decomposed as
S(T ) − S(tK ) = (logn)−ϵ (D(K )l + D
(K )
u ) + N (K )l + N
(K )
u ,
where N
(K )
l
and N
(K )
u are Poisson random variables given θ with means
n(θ (T − tK) − (logn)−ϵ )
M∑
m=1
dm(plm) and n((1 − θ )(T − tK ) − (logn)−ϵ )
M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
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respectively.7 On the other hand, on the event θ ∈ (0, 1), nc − S(tK ) is equal to
(T − tK )(θD(K )l + (1 − θ )D
(K )
u ) by (13). Therefore,
E[|S(T ) − nc |] ≤ E
[(nc − S(tK )) − ((logn)−ϵ (D(K )l + D(K )u ) + N (K )l + N (K )u ) I{θ∈(0,1)}]
+ E[S(T ) + nc]P(θ < (0, 1))
= E
[(nc − S(tK )) − ((logn)−ϵ (D(K )l + D(K )u ) + N (K )l + N (K )u ) I{θ∈(0,1)}]
+O(log(n)nP(θ < (0, 1)))
≤ E
[(θ (T − tK) − (logn)−ϵ )D(K )l − N (K )l ]
+ E
[((1 − θ )(T − tK) − (logn)−ϵ )D(K )u − N (K )u ] +O(log(n)n1/2)
(42)
The equality follows from the argument below (34): S(T ) can be expressed as the
sum ofK+1 Poisson random variables, conditional on Ft0 , . . . , FtK , FtK+2(logn)−ϵ re-
spectively. Therefore, applying the tower propertywe have E[S(T )] = O(log(n)n)
by the fact that K + 1 = O(logn). To bound the first term of (42), we have
E
[(θ (T − tK ) − (logn)−ϵ )D(K )l − N (K )l ]
≤E
[
(θ (T − tK ) − (logn)−ϵ )
D(K )l − n M∑
m=1
dm(plm)

]
+ E
[N (K )l − n(θ (T − tK) − (logn)−ϵ ) M∑
m=1
dm(plm)

]
≤(T − tK)E
[
E
[D(K )l − n M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
 FtK
]]
+ E
[
E
[N (K )l − n(θ (T − tK ) − (logn)−ϵ ) M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
 θ
] ]
≤(T − tK)(logn)ϵ/2E

(
n
M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
)1/2 + E

(
n(θ (T − tK) − (logn)−ϵ )
M∑
m=1
dm(plm)
)1/2
=O((logn)ϵn1/2),
In the last inequality, we have applied Lemma 10 to the centralized version of the
Poisson random variables of (logn)−ϵD(K )
l
and N
(K )
l
. Similarly, we can bound the
7The variable θ is determined by D
(K )
l
and D
(K )
u , and thus measurable w.r.t. FtK+2(logn)−ϵ .
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second term of (42). This completes the proof of (16).
To bound (17), note that
E
[∫ T0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt − c

]
≤ E
[S(tK )/n − ∫ tK0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt

]
+ E
[c − S(tK )/n − ∫ TtK
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt

]
(43)
The first term satisfies
E
[S(tK)/n − ∫ tK0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt

]
≤
K−1∑
k=1
n−1E
[
E
[(S(tk+1) − S(tk)) − n ∫ tk+1tk
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
 Ftk
]]
≤
K−1∑
k=1
n−1/2E
[∫ tk+1
tk
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
]
≤
K−1∑
k=1
n−1/2
√
M1τ (k).
The second inequality applies Lemma 10 to the centered Poisson random variable
S(tk+1) − S(tk ) − n
∫ tk+1
tk
∑M
m=1 dm(Pm(t))dt . The last inequality is due to the fact
that dm(Pm(t)) ≤ M1. Now, note that by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and
Lemma 1
K−1∑
k=1
√
τ (k) ≤ (K
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k))1/2 = O((logn)1/2).
Therefore, the first term of (43) is O((logn)1/2n−1/2). Next we bound the second
term of (43), Note that by the design of the algorithm, only plm and p
u
m are used
in phase K for type-m customers and moreover∫ T
tK
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt = (T − tK )
M∑
m=1
(θdm(plm) + (1 − θ )dm(pum)).
In the proof of (16), we have shown that on the event θ ∈ (0, 1), nc − S(tK ) =
(T − tK)(θD(K )l + (1 − θ )D
(K )
u ). Therefore, plugging in those quantities into the
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second term of (43), we have
E
[c − S(tK )/n − ∫ TtK
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt

]
≤E
[c − S(tK )/n − ∫ TtK
M∑
m=1
dm(Pm(t))dt
 I{θ∈(0,1)}
]
+ (E[S(tK)/n] +O(1))P(θ < (0, 1))
≤ 1
n
E
[
θ (T − tK)
D(K )l − n M∑
m=1
dm(plm)

]
+
1
n
E
[
(1 − θ )(T − tK )
D(K )u − n M∑
m=1
dm(pum)

]
+O(n−1/2)
≤T
n
E
[D(K )l − n M∑
m=1
dm(plm)

]
+
T
n
E
[D(K )u − n M∑
m=1
dm(pum)

]
+O(n−1/2)
≤O((logn)ϵn−1/2).
The last inequality is obtained by applying Lemma 10 to the centered version of
the Poisson random variables (logn)−ϵD(K )
l
and (logn)−ϵD(K )u . This completes the
proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Similar to (33) in the proof of Proposition 2, the total rev-
enue of J˜πn can be expressed as
E
[
J˜πn
]
=
K∑
k=1
E[ J˜πn,k] − pE
[(S(T ) − nc)+] .
By Lemma 8, pE[(S(T ) −nc)+] ≤ pE[|S(T ) −nc |] = O((logn)ϵn1/2). The first term
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can be expressed as
K∑
k=1
E[ J˜πn,k] = E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))dt
]
≥ E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
Pm(t)dm(Pm(t))dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
= nT
M∑
m=1
p∗mdm(p∗m)P(∩Kk=1Ak ∩ BK )
− E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t)))dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
≥ JDn (T , c) −O(n1/2)
− E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t)))dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
because P(∩K
k=1
Ak ∩ BK ) = O(n−1/2) by Lemma 5. Define a stochastic process
ξm(t) , dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t)), and define r ∗′m and r ∗′′m to be the first- and second-
order derivative of rm(λ) = λd−1m (λ) at λ = dm(p∗m). Note that in the case of z∗ > 0,
dm(p∗m) is not the unconstrained maximizer of rm(·). By Taylor’s expansion, we
have
E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(p∗mdm(p∗m) − Pm(t)dm(Pm(t)))dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
≤E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(r ∗′m ξm(t) + |r ∗′′m |ξm(t)2)dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
≤E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
r ∗′m ξm(t)dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK }
]
+M4E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(ξm(t))2dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
.
(44)
Next we show that r ∗′1 = r
∗′
2 = . . . = r
∗′
M = z
∗. Indeed, p∗m maximizes Rm(z∗) by
Proposition 1. Equivalently, λ = dm(p∗m) maximizes rm(λ) − λz∗ . The first-order
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condition implies r ∗′m = z∗. Therefore, the first term in (44) is bounded above by
E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
r ∗′m ξm(t)dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
≤nz∗E
[∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(
dm(p∗m) − dm(Pm(t))
)
dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK}
]
≤nz∗E
[c − ∫ T0 M∑m=1dm(Pm(t))dt

]
.
By Lemma 8, the above term is O((logn)ϵn1/2).
For the second term in (44), note that on the event ∩K
k=1
AK ∩BK , we have that
for allm Pm(t) − p∗m ≤ ∆¯(k) ∀t ∈ (tk , tk+1], k = 1, . . . ,K − 1
=⇒ |ξm(t)| ≤ M2∆¯(k) ∀t ∈ (tk , tk+1], k = 1, . . . ,K − 1
and Pm(t) − p∗m  ≤ ∆¯(K ) + (logn)1+9ϵn−1/4 ≤ 2(logn)1+9ϵn−1/4 ∀t ∈ (tK ,T ]
=⇒ |ξm(t)| ≤ 2M2(logn)1+9ϵn−1/4 ∀t ∈ (tK ,T ]
Therefore, by the choice of τ (k) and ∆¯(k),
E
[
n
∫ T
0
M∑
m=1
(ξm(t))2dtI{∩K
k=1
Ak∩BK }
]
≤ n
K−1∑
k=1
τ (k)(∆¯(k))2 + 4M22τ (K )(logn)2+18ϵn1/2
≤(K − 1)(logn)1+15ϵn1/2 + 4M22τ (K )(logn)2+18ϵn1/2
=O((logn)2+18ϵn1/2).
This completes the proof. 
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